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1 Introduction
Last decades have been characterized by a radical change in the economic
structure of developed economies, and by the success of digital technology
as the main way to produce and exchange most of the knowledge. If, on the
one hand, the growing simplicity in communications has allowed an unpre-
dictable development in many sectors of the modern society, on the other
hand, this shifting has reduced the technological advantage of traditional
countries, especially in the manufacturing. Moreover, technological life cy-
cles have become shorter, requiring increasing investment in risky activities.
In this modified context, R&D investments become central for firms strat-
egy, and sharing the risk with allies has increased the relevance of collabora-
tive research, being furthermore an important mechanism to obtain external
knowledge (Shilling, 2009). Consequently, in the years the number of coop-
erating firms has increased (Hagedoorn, 2002): according to the Community
Innovation Survey (CIS), in 2016 in Europe the percentage of cooperative
innovative firms has exceeded the 30 percent.
In Italy, SMEs have always been crucial in enhancing economic growth
and development, despite their resource constraints with respect to bigger
players in the market. On the one hand, these constraints force firms to in-
vest on internal resources; on the other hand, they boost SMEs to search for
external knowledge and competencies. Indeed, external knowledge is an es-
sential input to the innovation activity of SMEs, Chun and Mun (2012) state:
”One viable way for SMEs to enhance the inflow of knowledge from outside
of the firm is through R&D cooperation with sources of external knowledge,
such as other firms, research institutions, and universities”. At the same
time, SMEs must efficiently and effectively use the knowledge and the skills
of managers and employees they already have, to continue competing in the
knowledge economy.
In this modified environment, the role of human capital has to be carefully
analysed, since it is one of the most important internal resources of the firms.
Human capital may affect the ability of firms to innovate, to generate profits,
and to compete in the market.
A growing literature has analyzed the determinants of cooperation;1 how-
ever, papers focusing on SMEs are relatively scarce,2 and, despite its impor-
1Next section of the paper introduces the literature; more extended surveys in, inter
alia, Marinucci (2012) and Silipo (2008).
2A relevant exception is Chun and Mun (2012), who study the determinant of R&D
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tance as input, the literature on the determinants of cooperation in R&D
has basically ignored firm’s human capital, as a possible explicatory vari-
able. A branch of this literature (Colombo et al., 2006; Okamuro et al.,
2011) has studied the role of founders’ human capital in firm’s R&D cooper-
ation choices. This approach, that is easily implementable, may be relevant
for technological start-ups, but may not reflect the R&D ability of most of
the firms. In this paper, we extend the literature, testing the role of the
human capital as one of the direct determinants of R&D cooperation. Fur-
thermore, human capital influences the abilities of the firms not only directly,
but indirectly as well, affecting their skills. In recent years some literature
has concentrated on its moderating role,3 in particular with respect to in-
vestments and innovation.4 We extend these models, arguing that human
capital may influence the ability of SMEs to exploit and to obtain exter-
nal incentives, such as orders (both public and private), and subsidies. To
disentangle this aspect, we analyze its role as moderator with the variables
orders and subsidies, that are some of the main determinants of R&D coop-
eration. Thus, the current paper sought not only to provide evidence of the
relationship between incentives and R&D cooperation, but also to explore
the boundary conditions influencing this effect, i.e. the moderating role of
human capital. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to analyze
this aspect of human capital.
Furthermore, we analyze in-deep the determinants of R&D cooperation
for high-tech SMEs. In this sector, firms, independently of the size, have to
invest a huge amount of resources in R&D activity; thus, their motivations
to cooperate in R&D may differ from the motivations of SMEs in different
sectors. For example, high-tech SMEs may cooperate with private partners
to rapidly enter the market a new product, whereas other SMEs cooperate
to share risks and costs of the R&D activity.
Moreover, it is important to underline that most of the papers on the
determinants of cooperation build explanatory variables using qualitative
cooperation in a sample of Korean firms, concentrating on the role of spillovers.
3According to Little et al.(2007), there is moderation when the presence of a variable
W (moderator) influences the impact of a variable X (moderated) on the outcome Y; this
influence can be modeled by creating a new variable that is the product of the moderated
variable and the moderating one (XW). When the effect of XW is significant, the effect of
X on Y is dependent upon the level of W.
4See, inter alia, Park, 2012; Bornay-Barrachina et.al, 2012; Kwon and Rupp, 2013.
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indexes,5 that may lack of objectivity. On the contrary, following the same
approach we used in Cantabene and Grassi (2018),6 we build robust explana-
tory variables, basing our analysis on an original dataset, containing firm
level information about R&D activity and balance sheets; in other words,
we use variables based on objective measures and verifiable data. Using a
control function approach, which is consistent in non-linear models (Rivers
and Vuong, 1988; Wooldridge,2002), we take into account the possible en-
dogeneity of pubic subsidies, incoming spillovers and R&D intensity due to
reverse causality or simultaneity in the decision to cooperate in R&D, and
then we correct if necessary.
Finally, we study the Italian case that, despite its peculiarity,7 has been
little investigated in the literature on R&D.8
We find that human capital facilitates cooperation, and it has a crucial
role in the cooperation with the public, and in the high-tech sector; however,
its moderating role depends on the type of disaggregation and/or the part-
ner. We obtain analogous results analyzing the effect of public and private
incentives, that, confirming previous literature, boost R&D cooperation in
most of the disaggregations we study.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 locates the paper with respect
to the literature and introduces the hypotheses; section 3 describes the data
and econometric strategy; section 4 illustrates the results, with section 4.2
focusing on the high-tech sector; section 5 concludes.
5For example, in Europe scholars often measure spillovers, risk, etc., summing the score
(from 0 to 4) expressed by the firms involved in the Community Innovation Survey.
6The availability of more accurate data allows us to extend the analysis of Cantabene
and Grassi (2018). Here, we study the case of different partners (public and private
firms), and add two explanatory variables: patents and human capital. The first, a proxy
of the outgoing spillovers, is a dummy taking value 1 if the firm reports patents costs in
her balance sheet; the second one is given by the share of graduated people over R&D
employees.
7For example, with respect to the productive structure of other industrialized countries,
in Italy there is a relative low number of large multinational firms, a relative low number
of high-tech firms, a relative high number of SMEs, a substantial divide between North
and South of the country.
8Papers studying the effect of R&D subsidies on R&D cooperation in Italy are Colombo
et al. (2006), Carboni (2013), and Cantabene and Grassi (2018). Other papers investigat-
ing, from different prospectives, the profitability of R&D investment in Italy are Fantino
and Cannone (2011), Ardovino and Pennacchio (2014), Magri (2014), Cerulli et al. (2016),
Bellucci et al. (2018).
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2 Related literature and hypotheses
2.1 Human capital and its moderating role
Human capital has long been considered a critical resource for the firms
(Pfeffer, 1994). Spender (1996) argued that firm’s knowledge is the core of the
theory of the firm. Grant (1996) states that knowledge is the most important
asset. Lepak and Snell (1999) argue that firms create value developing human
capital. In the knowledge based economies, the human element has increased
in centrality and importance, to react and adapt to markets changes, and one
answer to the question why similar firms differ in performance, is that they
differ in human capital (Hitt et al., 2001).
Skilled employees contribute to absorb knowledge from inside and outside
firms’ boundaries, and a well educated human capital should be important,
particularly in SMEs which may lack of resources to invest broadly in R&D.
Human capital is central in the innovation process and we would expect that
firms with higher proportion of highly skilled employees in R&D, will be more
likely to cooperate compared with firms with lower level of human capital,
in order to exploit their competitive advantage, and develop innovations. In-
deed, it is well-known in the economic and in the management literature that
innovation plays a central role in firm competitiveness (Macher and Mowery,
2009; Wolfe, 1994). Its importance underscores the necessity of finding the
key factors associated with it (Damanpour and Schneider, 2006; Subrama-
niam and Youndt, 2005), and R&D cooperation is one of these factors.
Many studies analyze the effect of human capital on the innovational skills
of the firms (Bornay Barrachina et al., 2012; Mc Guirk et al., 2015, Bosma
et al., 2004); however, there are surprisingly few studies that empirically
investigate the relationship between R&D cooperation and human capital.
Although a theoretical perspective suggests a positive relationship between
these variables, we need concrete empirical evidence to support this propo-
sition. Classic human capital theory argues that specific ability and skills
of its workforce affect firm’s productivity (Becker, 1962; Strober, 1990); in
a broader way, we can extend this argument to the ability to collaborate
in R&D, which is crucial for the innovational skills of SMEs, in the knowl-
edge based economy. While some papers have concentrated on the level of
skills and human capital of the founder of the firms (Colombo et al., 2006;
Okamuro et al., 2011; Honjo, et al. 2014; Cao and Im, 2018), we focus on
the human capital level of the firms R&D sector. This approach is closer to
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the management literature’s intuition to analyze the level of human capital
that an organization has as a whole (e.g., Hitt et al., 2001; Pennings et al.,
1998). By definition, an organization with more human capital holds many
employees with high levels of knowledge, skill, and ability. In other words,
firm performance is influenced not only by the key managers but also by the
quality of the total pool of human capital within the organization (Wright et
al., 1995). We argue that this argument is valid for the R&D cooperation as
well, i.e. the level of human capital in the R&D department influences R&D
cooperation. The literature has not investigated this link. In this paper, we
fill this gap, including in the analysis the variable Human Capital, defined as
the share of graduated people over R&D employees, expecting that human
capital contributes to facilitate R&D cooperation:
• H1: Human capital facilitates R&D cooperation.
Previous studies have investigated the relationship between innovation
and human capital in deep (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Subramaniam and
Youndt, 2005), suggesting a positive relation between these variables; other
studies have tried to determine the direct effect of human capital on innova-
tion (Alegre et al., 2006; McKelvie and Davidsson, 2006; Galunic and Rodan,
1998; Teece et al., 1997); however, despite the role that human capital is as-
sumed to have on innovation, few studies have considered human capital as
a variable that mediates and/or moderates the effects of other variables,9 no
one has analyzed the moderating role of human capital for R&D cooperation.
Human capital is an essential resource in implementing organizational
strategy, providing an organization with a unique competitive advantage
(Barney, 1991), and giving to employees an opportunity to earn more (Wright
et al., 1995; Becker, 1962). It is a strategic element that allows firms to bet-
ter perform and that should facilitate R&D cooperation. However, there is
not only a direct effect of human capital on the firms propensity to cooperate
in R&D; indeed, firms with high skilled employee should be able to exploit
the opportunity given by external incentives, such as subsides and orders;
i.e., we aspect firm’s human capital and incentives to interact, in order to
indirectly boost R&D cooperation. It is a well-known evidence that firms
with less human capital are likely to expect lower rewards and performance
(Becker, 1962); we extend this argument to the ability to exploit external in-
centives, such as subsidies and orders. In other words, we expect companies
9Kwon and Rupp, 2013; Park, 2012; Bornay-Barrachina et.al, 2012.
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with human capital to be more effective in exploit external spillovers, and
obtain subsidies and orders, than companies without human capital.
Our focus in this paper is on the interaction between human capital and
incentives, and our aim is to understand how human capital moderates the
relationship between R&D cooperation and public and private incentives; i.e.,
we argue that the human capital is the moderator and the variables subsidy
and orders (both public and private) are the moderated: the presence of
human capital may modify the impact of these incentives on the probability
of a firm to cooperate in R&D.
These arguments leads to the following hypothesis:
• H2: Human capital moderates the impact of incentives on R&D coop-
eration
2.2 Incentives
Public and private incentives affect the probability that firms cooperate in
R&D.10 Subsidies should have a positive effect on R&D cooperation; however,
a review of the empirical literature suggests that the effects of R&D subsidies
on the R&D cooperation are mixed; furthermore, public subsidies may crowd-
out private investment, boosting projects that firms would have financed even
without incentives.11 Spillovers refer to the exchange of ideas, know-how and
experiences between firms engaged in R&D cooperation activities.
Theoretical literature has studied the role that knowledge spillovers have
on the incentives to cooperate in R&D, showing that, in general, spillovers
high enough facilitate R&D cooperation.12 Empirical efforts have tried to
confirm these results, and evidences suggests that firms characterized by
10See Cantabene and Grassi (2018).
11Belderbos et al. (2004) find that the impact of subsides on cooperation is not signifi-
cantly different from zero; Colombo et al. (2006) find a similar result in a sample of Italian
high-tech firms; on the contrary, Miotti and Sachwald (2003), Piga and Vivarelli (2004)
Busom and Fernandez-Ribas (2008), Abramovsky et al.(2009), Carboni (2013) and Franco
and Gussoni (2014) find some statistically significant effect of subsides on cooperation in
R&D.
12The seminal theoretical contribution is d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), where
authors, comparing different scenarios find that, for substantial spillovers, cooperative
R&D leads to higher profits and social welfare. Kamien et al. (1992) introduce in the
analysis product differentiation. Other contributions in Choi (1993), Leahy and Neary
(1997), Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001), Capuano and Grassi (2018), under slightly
different model setting, confirm these results.
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higher incoming spillovers and better appropriation have, a higher proba-
bility to cooperate, with some limitations depending on partners, firm size,
sector etc.13 In the literature, surveys and investigations try to measure the
importance of spillovers; i.e., qualitative indexes measure some central vari-
ables, such as spillovers and risk sharing: for example, in the CIS firms have
to declare the grade of relevance they give to knowledge spillovers (or to cost
and risk sharing), using a four-point scale. On the contrary, we concentrate
on the measurable variable Orders as source of incoming spillovers: we argue
that, whatever the partner, firms realizing research orders are more likely to
cooperate, because the innovation activity increases the incoming spillovers,
since it is realized on behalf of a third party which is outside the boundaries
of the firm.
In order to obtain insight on the interaction between firms and other
players outside the border of the firm, our first investigation question is
about the role of incentives, both public (subsidies and public orders) and
private (private orders):
• H3: Incentives (both public and private) facilitate R&D cooperation.
In the analysis we distinguish orders according to the source: we can
have public orders (from universities or other public institutions), and private
orders (from other firms).
Figure 1 describes the conceptual framework, showing the interaction
between the hypotheses.
Figure 1: Conceptual framework and hypotheses
13Contributions include Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), Belderbos et al. (2004), Veugel-
ers and Cassiman (2005), Lopez (2008).
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3 Data Set and Econometric Model
3.1 Data
The empirical analysis is based on an original dataset including 6505 firms
participating to the RS survey on R&D intra-muros in Italy. According
to the Italian National Statistical Office (ISTAT) the RS survey includes
all the Italian firms with more than 100 employees, and all the firms that,
irrespective of their size, are in a position to be able to carry out R&D
activities during the reference year.14 The dataset includes only the firms
reporting a positive amount of intramural R&D expenditure in at least one
year of the time span analyzed, that is 1998-2004.
Variables in the RS survey relate to different aspects of the R&D activity
of a firm, such as expenditure, personnel, financing, cooperation, research
order, and public subsidies; other informations about the economic and fi-
nancial activity of the firm, come from the firms’ balance sheets, provided by
ISTAT. Table (1) reports the descriptive statistics of the variables employed
in the empirical analysis.
3.2 Dependent variables
The dependent variable Coop, is a dichotomous variable showing value one if,
in year t, firm i realizes at least one R&D project in cooperation with someone
else. In tables (3) and (5) we have distinguished cooperation according to
the partners of the innovative activity. In particular, the dependent variables
are two dummies equal to one if the firm was engaged in an active R&D
partnership with universities and public agencies (Cooppub), or with private
firms (Cooppriv).
3.3 Independent variables
All the explanatory variables are largely used in the literature.15
Some firms may not have resources to invest in R&D activities, compen-
sating this lack with more educated workers, able to appropriate the results
of the innovative activity. Indeed, skilled employees contribute to absorb
14Information about the survey are included in the report ISTAT on RS, available at
http://www3.istat.it/salastampa/comunicati/non calendario/20041201 00/testointegrale.pdf
15For a discussion of the explanatory variable in the literature see Gussoni (2009).
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
SME
Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Coop 9981 .33 .47 0 1
Cooppub 9981 .16 .36 0 1
Cooppriv 9981 .25 .43 0 1
Human K. 9951 .34 .32 0 1
Subsidy 9981 .34 .47 0 1
Orderspub 9981 .08 .27 0 1
Orderspriv 9981 .18 .38 0 1
HK ∗ Subsidy 9951 .14 .27 0 1
HK ∗Ord.pub 9951 .05 .18 0 1
HK ∗Ord.priv 9951 .07 .21 0 1
R&D Int. 9981 .16 1.40 7.53−8 47.9
Patents 8035 .60 .49 0 1
Size 9794 3.81 1.14 -2.52 5.52
Size2 9794 15.8 7.74 0 30.43
Group 6339 .39 .49 0 1
Location 9981 .03 .18 0 1
Cash-flow 9002 -2.75 .91 -5.99 4.18
Risk 9981 .12 .48 0 11.5
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knowledge from inside and outside firms’ boundaries. Thus, we use the vari-
able Human K (defined as the share of graduated R&D employees over total
R&D employees) to measure this effect.
In order to test H3, we consider a dummy variable (Subsidy) identifying
firm that has received a public incentive to realize her R&D activity.
We investigate whether firms with skilled employees are more effective
in exploit external spillovers, and obtain subsidies and orders with respect
to firms with lower human capital, considering interaction between Human
K and the moderated variables, namely Subsidy, Public Orders and Private
Orders. These interaction variables capture how the presence of skilled em-
ployees in the R&D department modify the impact of public subsidies and
spillovers on the propensity to cooperate.
We measure incoming spillovers through research orders, a dummy vari-
able identifying firms realizing the R&D activity on behalf of someone which
is outside the boundaries of the firm. We can identify the source of spillovers
according to the partner of the order: universities and public institutions,
private firms.
It may be the case that firms attempt to appropriate the benefits of their
innovations, controlling information that flows out of the company. Cassiman
and Veugelers (2002) find that a greater appropriability of the innovation pro-
cess (lower outgoing spillovers) increases the probability to cooperate. Thus,
we include in the analysis two measures of appropriability: Patents (dummy
variable identifying firms reporting costs for patents’ protection) and R&D
Intensity (defined as the intramural R&D investment relative to turnover).
Patents limit external spillovers, ensuring patenting firms to appropriate the
results of their efforts. We have not a strong a priori on the intensity of this
variable, however, we aspect its effect to be stronger in case of collaboration
with private firms, rather than with public ones. Since in-house technolog-
ical knowledge is crucial to absorb external knowledge, the propensity to
be engaged in a cooperative agreement increases with the intensity of R&D
activities (Tether, 2002).
3.4 Control variables
The relationship between firm size and R&D cooperation is not clearly as-
sessed in the literature. Cooperation may be beneficial for small companies,
since it allows them to share fixed research costs. On the other hand, large
firms having the absorptive capacity required to exploit the benefits of R&D
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cooperation, may be more likely to be engaged in cooperative R&D.16 We ar-
gue that this arguments hold also for SMEs, since the behaviour and strategic
motivations of micro firms may differ from that of medium firms. Thus, we
control the size effect, including in the model the variable Size (defined as
the logarithm of total employee) and its squared (Size2), to allow for possible
non linearities.
Group firms may be informed about the capabilities and the attitude
to innovate of internal partners, and may use their position in the group to
attract internal partners for innovation. The dummy variableGroup captures
the membership of a firm to a wider company group.
We focus on SMEs, that are likely to realize their R&D activity using only
one plant. Nevertheless there are firms having more plants, in more regions.
Location is a dummy variable indicating the number of regions where firm
realizes her own R&D activity; it takes the value 0 if it is concentrated in one
region, 1 if it is realized in two or more. We expect that when the number
of locations increases the propensity to cooperate increases, too.
Financial constraints and the incompleteness of financial markets may
explain under-investment in R&D. Firms with higher internal liquidity might
have higher R&D expenditure and this could affect the amount of cooperative
R&D. Thus, we control for firms financial availability with the Cash− flow
variable.
Finally, the variable Risk considers the possibility that firm’s cooperate
to share the risk of investment. It is given by the ratio between shareholders
capital and total debt. We argue that the risk increases when the shareholders
capital decreases, or the total debt increases. Thus, we expect a negative
correlation between our measure of risk and firms propensity to cooperate in
R&D.
Table (2) summarizes the variables definition and their expected signs,
according to the literature.
3.5 Econometric strategy
The dependent variable is a dummy for firms engaged in R&D cooperation
agreement. Thus, we have a binary outcome variable in a panel data context.
Given our testing hypotheses, we assume that
16On the relation between size and R&D see, inter alia, Sakakibara (1997), Veugelers
(1997), Fritsch and Lukas (2001), Miotti and Sachwald (2003), Franco and Gussoni (2014).
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Table 2: Variables definition and expected sign according to the literature
Variable Definition Exp. sign
Coop dummy taking value 1 if the firm realizes her R&D activity
in cooperation with other public or private entities.
Human K. share of graduated people over R&D employees. (+)
Subsidy dummy taking value 1 if the firm has received a subsidy. (+)
HK ∗ Subsidy interaction between Human Capital and Subsidy (?)
Orderspub dummy taking value 1 if the firm realizes her R&D activity
on behalf of universities or other public research agencies. (+)
Orderspriv dummy taking value 1 if the firm realizes her R&D activity
on behalf of other private entities. (+)
HK ∗Ord.pub interaction between Human K and Orderspub. (?)
HK ∗Ord.priv interaction between Human K and Orderspriv. (?)
R&D Int. ratio between intramural R&D expenditure and turnover. (+)
Patents dummy taking value 1 if the firm reports patents costs in
her balance sheet. (+)
Size logarithm of employee. (?)
Size2 the square of Size. (?)
Group dummy taking value 1 if the firm belongs to a wider
company group. (?)
Location dummy taking value 1 if the firm realizes her R&D activity
in two or more regions. (+)
Cash-flow logarithm of cash-flow relative to turnover. (+)
Risk shareholders capital over total debt. (−)
Monetary variables are in thousands of euro at 2000 prices.
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Coopit = f(HumanKit, Subsidyit, HK ∗ Subsit, Orderspub/it,
Orderspriv/it, HK ∗Orderspub/it, HK ∗Orderspriv/it, Xit)
(1)
where i identifies the firm, t the year and X is the vector of control
variables.
The dependent variable, Coopit, is a dichotomous variable showing value
one if, in year t, the firm i realizes at least a R&D project in cooperation
with someone else. We estimate the change in the cooperation decision over
time using a panel data probit model with robust standard errors in order
to correct for eventual heteroskedasticity.
The empirical literature has introduced arguments for the possible endo-
geneity of some determinants of R&D cooperation, mainly pubic subsidies,
incoming spillovers and R&D intensity, due to reverse causality or simultane-
ity in the decision to engage in R&D cooperation. Since there are reasons
pro and cons, we first check for the endogeneity of the suspected variables,
then we correct it if necessary. We address the problem of endogeneity using
a control function approach, which is consistent in non-linear models (Rivers
and Vuong, 1988; Wooldridge, 2002). The approach consists in a two-stage
procedure: in the first stage the potential endogenous variables are regressed
on all the assumed exogenous explanatory variables and the instruments 17;
the predicted residuals are used in the second stage as additional regres-
sors in the structural equation without excluding the potential endogenous
variables.18
4 Results
With the aim to analyze the determinants of cooperation in Italy, we estimate
a model including all the SMEs; then, we distinguish cooperation with public
institutions and private firms. Finally, we concentrate on the determinants
for the high-tech sector, given the centrality of human capital in such a sector.
17The instruments we use are: i) basicness of R&D, ii) industry averages for each of
the potentially endogenous variables at the two-digit industry level, iii) dummies for the
geographic macroareas, iv) technology-intensive propensity.
18Results available on request.
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4.1 The determinants for SMEs
Table 3 shows the general results of the analysis. Column (a) illustrates the
model overall; however, firms may have different motivations to cooperate
with public entities (university and other public research centers), and with
other private firms (both belonging to the same group or other firms). Thus,
in column (b) and (c) we analyze the determinants distinguishing respectively
cooperation with public and with private firms.
In column (a) the variable human capital positively affects the propensity
to cooperate, while subsidies seems to be not significant. On the contrary,
orders (both public and private) are highly significant; hence, we argue that
external spillovers are an important determinants of cooperation for SMEs.
Confirming the results of previous empirical research (and thus the robustness
of our approach), we find the expected effect for the variables R&D intensity,
location, cash flow and risk sharing. Summing up, in the general model we
do not reject H1 and H2, and we partially reject H3.
Distinguishing cooperation by partner, results slightly change. While or-
ders (both public and private) continue to increase the probability to coop-
erate in R&D, independently from the partner, human capital and subsidies
affect cooperation with public partner only. This may be due to different
skills, as well as resources, needed to cooperate with the public and the
private sector. While research joint ventures (RJV) between private firms
are usually market-oriented,19 i.e. try to obtain marketable goods (product
innovations), or to decrease the production costs (process innovations), co-
operation with public involves basic R&D projects, whose results may not
be immediately direct to the market: this kind of projects needs specialized
skills, human capital, and huge financial resources.
The impact of the variable Human Capital, as moderator, is particularly
19There are numerous examples of companies that create an RJV, and then compete
in the market. Among them, since 1978 Fiat, Citroe¨n and Peugeot have been involved
in an RJV to jointly develop and assemble different models of cars. In 2005, BMW
and Mercedes decided to collaborate on developing hybrid engines. In 2007, a similar
deal involved Fiat and Tata. Analogously BMW and Toyota collaborated on developing
lithium-ion battery and diesel technology for sports cars. in 2011 Panasonic, Samsung,
Sony and XPAND 3D collaborated for the development of a new technology standard for
consumer 3D active glasses. In 2001 Sony, Toshiba and IBM started an R&D collaboration
to develop semiconductors (system LSI). In 2005, Sony, Konica and Minolta signed a joint
product development agreement for digital cameras (SLR) as a reaction to the Matsushita
and Olympus collaboration signed in the same year.
15
relevant in the case of cooperation with public sector (column b). The inter-
action term is significant both for the public and for the private incentives,
confirming the hypothesis H2. However, we have an interesting result: while
both orders and human capital positively affect the propensity to cooperate
with public partners, their interaction has a negative sign. This may mean
that the impact of external spillover on the SMEs’ propensity to cooperate is
decreasing in human capital. In general SMEs have financial constraint and
limited availability of resources, thus incentives are a crucial determinant of
the propensity to cooperate. However, when human capital increases, firms
skills increase as well, making the constraints less binding, thus the impact
of the incentives on R&D cooperation decreases. We obtain a similar result
for the variables Subsidy and HK*Subsidy. We argue that the availability
of skilled employees increases both the absorptive capacity and the appro-
priability of firms: according to our results, as human capital increases, the
importance of incentives in determining the firm’s cooperation with public
partners decreases.
Cooperation with private partners (column c) shows different results.
Subsidies and human capital do not directly affect R&D cooperation. In-
deed, we expect cooperation with private partner to have different motiva-
tions, with respect to cooperation with public institutions. In the case of
cooperation with private, the appropriability of the results plays a central
role: obtaining subsidies does not ensure appropriability, while the human
capital alone may not be enough; however, subsidies and human capital to-
gether increase the probability to cooperate in R&D. This is exactly the
moderating effect we expect human capital to have, in case of cooperation
in R&D, and it should lead to an increasing number of RJV in the private
sector, i.e. private companies that coordinate their R&D efforts in the re-
search stage, and then compete in the market.20 External spillovers continue
to be an important determinant of cooperation. The impact of public orders
on cooperation with private is decreasing in human capital, but we do not
estimate any effect of human capital on public orders. Thus, in case of coop-
eration with private partners we partially reject H2. Stressing the idea that
firms need mainly external incentives to cooperate with public, while they
rely more on internal resources to cooperate with private firms, we note that
cash-flow, location and risk sharing are strongly significant only for SMEs’
20See previous note for examples of RJV in the private sector, and Capuano and Grassi
(2018) for a more in-depth analysis.
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propensity to cooperate with private partners.
4.2 The determinants for high-tech SMEs
In this subsection, we focus our analysis on the determinants of R&D co-
operation for high-tech SMEs. Because of the high level of competition in
such a sector, high-tech SMEs engage high levels of R&D activity; thus,
their motivations to cooperate in R&D may differ from the motivations of
SMEs in different sectors. For example, high-tech SMEs may cooperate with
private partners to rapidly enter the market a new product, whereas other
SMEs cooperate to share risks and costs of the R&D activity. We argue
that the behaviour of these firms may be different, because of the peculiar
characteristics of their activity.
Table 5 shows the results in this sector. The first column (column d) does
not distinguishes the partners. In this case we do not reject H1 and H3, but
do reject H2.
With respect to the results obtained using the complete dataset (Table
3), the differences between the determinants of cooperation with public and
private partners are more evident. In the case of public institutions (column
e), public incentives (both subsidies and public orders) positively affect firms
propensity to cooperate. This result confirms the one obtained in the gen-
eral model, reinforcing the idea that, given the nature of the R&D project
realized with the public institutions, firms need huge resources and stimuli
to cooperate with public.
On the contrary, nor public subsidies neither public orders are significant
in the case of cooperation with private partners (column f). However, in
the case of orders, a sort of ’self reenforcing’ effect emerges: public orders
increases the propensity to cooperate with public partners, private orders
increases the propensity to cooperate with private partners. It may be the
sign of locking-in: realizing research activity with a partner, a firm develops
skills useful for cooperating with that partner.
Independently from the partner, in the high-tech sector human capital is
always a relevant determinant of R&D cooperation, confirming H1. However,
we do not estimate any impact of human capital as moderator nor with public
subsidies, neither with private orders, whatever the partner, and the variable
HC ∗Ordpub is not significant as well, in the case of coopeation with private,
and has a low level of signficant in the case of cooperation with public.
Thus, for high-tech SMEs the moderating effect of human capital partially
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Table 3: Determinants of cooperation, SMEs
(a) (b) (c)
Human K. 0.250*** 0.238*** 0.067
(3.89) (3.98) (1.45)
Subsidy -0.010 0.270*** -0.036
(-0.24) (2.66) (-1.28)
HK ∗ Subsidy 0.337*** -0.357** 0.244***
(4.04) (-2.22) (4.17)
Orderspub 2.220*** 0.668*** 1.303***
(3.76) (3.81) (3.43)
Orderspriv 0.714** 0.155* 0.417**
(2.46) (1.75) (1.99)
HK ∗Ord.pub -2.872*** -0.820*** -1.791***
(-3.30) (-3.21) (-3.24)
HK ∗Ord.priv -0.924** -0.236* -0.416
(-2.08) (-1.72) (-1.30)
R&D Int. 0.524*** 0.224*** 0.125***
(3.80) (5.07) (2.92)
Patents 0.004 0.006 -0.000
(0.21) (0.92) (-0.02)
Size -0.075 0.012 -0.046
(-1.60) (0.87) (-1.57)
Size2 0.016** 0.001 0.008*
(2.51) (0.31) (1.92)
Group 0.005 0.006 0.012
(0.28) (1.03) (0.89)
Location 0.092** 0.012 0.076***
(2.29) (1.01) (2.91)
Cash-flow 0.031*** 0.003 0.016**
(2.88) (0.97) (2.18)
Risk -0.086** -0.011 -0.051**
(-2.39) (-1.25) (-2.23)
N 4666 4666 4666
Wald 313.95*** 274.78*** 241.26***
Note: random effects panel probit model with robust standard errors. The left-hand
variable is a dummy for the cooperation in R&D projects. The estimated coefficients
are the marginal effect of the independent variable on the probability of cooperation,
ceteris paribus. All regressions contain calendar year dummies (results not reported).
Standardized normal z-test values are in parentheses.
*significant at 0.1 level; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01.
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disappears.
This interesting result may show that, using human capital as a modera-
tor, in general we capture the impact of the interaction between constrained
skills (human capital) and limited resources (public and private incentives)
on SMEs’ propensity to cooperate. However, such an interaction is not sig-
nificant in the high-tech sectors, since high tech SMEs have to invest in
R&D, and consequently have to cooperate in R&D, in order to survive in the
market.
Coherently with previous studies, we find a positive impact of R&D in-
tensity, Location and Size.
Table 4 summarizes the results, with respect to our starting hypotheses.
Table 4: The results on the hypotheses, according to the disaggregation
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
H1 N N R N N N
H2 N N P R P R
H3 P N P N P P
R = Rejected; N = Not Rejected; P = Partially Rejected
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Table 5: Determinants of cooperation, high-tech SMEs
(d) (e) (f)
Human K. 0.351*** 0.224** 0.230*
(2.68) (2.15) (1.81)
Subsidy 0.227*** 0.214*** 0.111
(2.65) (3.07) (1.26)
HK ∗ Subsidy -0.005 -0.055 -0.042
(-0.03) (-0.46) (-0.25)
Orderspub 0.407** 0.329*** 0.075
(2.11) (2.94) (0.59)
Orderspriv 0.286** 0.005 0.342***
(2.27) (0.05) (2.91)
HK ∗Ord.pub -0.367 -0.351* -0.006
(-1.14) (-1.83) (-0.03)
HK ∗Ord.priv -0.319 0.024 -0.349
(-1.28) (0.13) (-1.57)
R&D Int. 0.249 1.551*** 0.286*
(1.40) (2.68) (1.75)
Patents -0.033 0.006 -0.062
(-0.57) (0.15) (-1.18)
Size 0.096 0.275*** 0.152**
(0.91) (3.03) (1.97)
Size2 -0.001 -0.023*** -0.010
(-0.09) (-2.63) (-1.35)
Group 0.024 -0.022 0.042
(0.40) (-0.46) (0.81)
Location 0.227*** 0.070 0.136*
(2.77) (1.37) (1.79)
Cash-flow 0.044 0.005 0.022
(1.48) (0.24) (0.84)
Risk -0.036 0.043 0.006
(-0.83) (1.50) (0.16)
N 568 568 568
Wald 57.37*** 55.97*** 47.41***
Note: random effects panel probit model with robust standard errors. The left-hand
variable is a dummy for the cooperation in R&D projects. The estimated coefficients
are the marginal effect of the independent variable on the probability of cooperation,
ceteris paribus. All regressions contain calendar year dummies (results not reported).
Standardized normal z-test values are in parentheses.
*significant at 0.1 level; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the determinants of R&D cooperation for
SMEs in Italy, distinguishing the cooperation by partner, and concentrating
on the high-tech sector. In particular, we have introduced in the literature
human capital as one of determinants, studied its moderating role, and fo-
cused our analysis on subsidies and orders as determinant of cooperation.
Our paper underlines the crucial role of human capital: the results suggest
that it affects the propensity of firms to cooperate in R&D, and that its effects
are both direct and indirect. Directly, we show that human capital boosts
cooperation in R&D (we do not reject H1 in all the cases, but one). Indirectly,
i.e. concentrating on its moderating role, the effect of human capital on
R&D cooperation appears to be more complex than originally assumed. We
argue that it captures the impact of resources and/or skills constraints on
the SMEs’ propensity to cooperate. In the cases where these constraints may
seriously affect the propensity to cooperate, we find that the more human
capital, the less the importance of incentives as factors determining the firm’s
cooperation with other partners. Coherently, the moderating effect of human
capital disappears for high-tech SMEs, whose propensity to cooperate may
depend on the nature of the competition (and the research) in the sector.
These results have important implications, since underlines the centrality
of human capital even in this aspect of the business management of the
SMEs. Firms wishing to invest in R&D need a well-educated workforce, to
collaborate with external partners, in particular the institutional ones.
Furthermore, our research confirms the centrality of public and private
incentives to boost cooperation, even if, in the case of SMEs, the significant
and the magnitude of the results seem to depend on the partner. In particu-
lar, we note that, in the high-tech sector, public incentives boost cooperation
with the public, while private incentives increase the probability to cooper-
ate with private partners. In general, we can never completely reject H3, i.e.
external incentives play a central role as stimuli for R&D cooperation.
Economic literature suggests that cooperation in R&D could enable firms
to overcome some of the structural problems, creating scale economy in R&D,
and sharing risks and costs between firms; the results of our study suggest
that human capital may have a central role as well in stimulating such a
cooperation, and that the State can boost cooperation through public orders
and subsidies, consequently stimulating innovation, investment, and finally
growth.
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In general, we can see that the determinants of R&D cooperation tend
to differ among different type of cooperation partners, and between sectors.
This finding suggests to study separately the different types of cooperation,
since a result based on a general model may not capture all the details.
22
Table 6: Correlation Matrix
Coop. Coop. Coop. Subsidy Orderspub Orderspriv Human K HK*Sub.
Coop. 1.000
Cooppub 0.6177* 1.000
Cooppriv 0.8187* 0.2892* 1.000
Subsidy 0.2647* 0.3146* 0.1777* 1.000
Orderspub 0.3027* 0.4135* 0.2034* 0.3086* 1.000
Orderspriv 0.2028* 0.1246* 0.2389* 0.0673* 0.2473* 1.000
H.K. 0.1999* 0.2649* 0.1141* 0.1329* 0.2376* 0.0801* 1.0000
HK*Sub 0.3180* 0.3896* 0.2148* 0.7038* 0.4234* 0.1351* 0.5175* 1.000
HK*Pub 0.2777* 0.3873* 0.1946* 0.2900* 0.8832* 0.2351* 0.3357* 0.5094*
HK*Priv 0.2224* 0.2199* 0.2353* 0.1452* 0.3505* 0.7391* 0.3483* 0.3245*
R&D Int. 0.0609* 0.0864* 0.0412* 0.0521* 0.0755* 0.0308* 0.0303* 0.0561*
Pat. -0.0042 0.0145 -0.0106 0.0085 -0.0349* -0.0293* 0.0009 0.0063
Size -0.0082 -0.0023 -0.0177 -0.0328* -0.1169* -0.1044* -0.1454* -0.1249*
Size2 0.0127 0.0145 -0.0033 -0.0201* -0.0927* -0.0948* -0.1187* -0.1043*
Group 0.1134* 0.0820* 0.1065* -0.0099 0.0376* 0.0594* 0.0561* 0.0095
Location 0.1123* 0.1256* 0.1041* 0.0896* 0.1394* 0.0840* 0.0993* 0.1413*
Cash-Flow 0.0877* 0.1078* 0.0636* 0.0394* 0.0579* 0.0217* 0.0902* 0.0669*
Risk -0.0012 0.0333* 0.0065 -0.0060 0.0525* 0.0229* 0.0248* 0.0138
HK*Pub. HK*Priv. R&D size Patents Size Size2 Group Location
HK*Pub. 1.000
HK*Priv 0.4094* 1.000
R&D Int. 0.0643* 0.0490* 1.000
Patents -0.0277* -0.0211 -0.0434* 1.0000
Size -0.1464* -0.1452* -0.1319* 0.2154* 1.000
Size2 -0.1209* -0.1259* -0.1000* 0.2124* 0.9669* 1.000
Group 0.0237 0.0328* -0.0190 0.1312* 0.3541* 0.3744* 1.000
Location 0.1508* 0.1199* 0.0195 0.0009 0.0227* 0.0324* 0.0872* 1.000
Cash-Flow 0.0472* 0.0543* 0.1534* 0.0192 0.0025 0.0290* 0.0701* 0.0199
Risk 0.0450* 0.0302* -0.0177 -0.0331* 0.0402* 0.0410* 0.0988* 0.0278*
Cash-Flow Risk
Cash-Flow 1.000
Risk 0.1211* 1.000
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